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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Christopher Welshans was convicted of 
distribution and possession of child pornography in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252.  In this direct appeal, Welshans raises 
two claims.  First, he argues that his due process right to a fair 
trial was violated because the prosecution informed the jury, 
through both evidence and argument, that his child 
pornography files included deeply abhorrent videos and 
images of bestiality, bondage, and acts of violence against 
very young children.  Second, Welshans raises a procedural 
sentencing claim, challenging the application of the 




 Regarding his first claim, we agree with Welshans on 
two points—that the challenged evidence was inadmissible 
under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and United 
States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 391 (3d Cir. 2012), and 
that the prosecutor’s closing argument improperly appealed to 
the passions of the jury.  However, we conclude that the 
misconduct did not so infect Welshans’s trial with unfairness 
as to violate due process.  Therefore, we will affirm his 
conviction.  As to Welshans’s sentencing claim, we will 






 In February 2014, the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney 
General determined that child pornography was being shared 
by an Internet Protocol (IP) address associated with a 
subscriber later identified as Welshans’s aunt.  Law 
enforcement agents executed a search warrant on her home on 
March 21, 2014 at 7:30 a.m.  The agents found no child 
pornography, but learned that Welshans, who lived nearby, 
used the wireless Internet at his aunt’s house.   
 
 Immediately thereafter, half of the agents went to 
Welshans’s house to set up surveillance and to make note of 
any people leaving or entering.  The other agents quickly 
obtained a search warrant.   
 
 Around the same time, Welshans’s aunt called him 
with a warning that police officers were “on their way” to his 
house, App. 497, and were “looking for stuff” involving his 
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computers, App. 495.  At 9:30 a.m., Welshans began moving 
files into his laptop computer’s recycling bin.   
 
 At 10:10 a.m., agents executed a search warrant at 
Welshans’s home.  Welshans, who was combative, was 
“detained,” handcuffed, and removed from the house.  App. 
339.  He was held by two agents at the rear of a marked 
police car, and later detained un-cuffed inside the cruiser.  
 
 Meanwhile, Welshans’s laptop computer continued to 
move files into the recycling bin.  As explained at trial, this 
process could run automatically because, after a user selects 
multiple files to drag into the recycling bin, the process runs 
until all of the selected files are moved.  This process was 
interrupted at 11:05 a.m. by an agent, who discovered 
Welshans’s laptop and pulled out its battery.  By this time, 
approximately seven hundred and fifty files had been moved 
into the recycling bin.  They were easily restored, and none 
were lost.   
 
 In total, the Government recovered an extensive 
collection of child pornography files from both the laptop and 
from Welshans’s desktop computer—over ten thousand 
images and hundreds of videos.  Welshans did not dispute 
that the recovered material was child pornography.  Nor did 
he dispute that child pornography had been distributed 
through a file-sharing network from his laptop.   
 
 Welshans admitted that he was the sole user of his 
laptop and desktop computers.  (A Government expert 
reached the same conclusion based upon a forensic review of 
them).  Welshans also admitted that he used his aunt’s 
wireless Internet, the IP address that distributed the child 
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pornography.  He conceded that he installed and used a file-
sharing network on his laptop, and that he was at his aunt’s 
house on March 20, 2014—the last date that child 
pornography files were added to his laptop and the day before 
his arrest. 
 
 But Welshans disputed whether he knew that there was 
child pornography on his computers.  He testified and denied 
any such knowledge, but offered “no explanation” for how 




 As stated above, the Government recovered an 
extensive trove of child pornography from Welshans’s 
computers.  Exactly what the jury heard about the content of 
these files is central to this appeal, and so we must describe 
this content in detail.  See Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 377 n.8 
(confronting the same problem).   
 
 This content, as will become clear, was particularly 
“loathsome” even within the universe of child pornography 
crimes.  Id. at 381 n.10.  Its particular nature elicits strong 
responses of disgust and anger.  Therefore, for the sake of the 
reader, we will only summarize the evidence.  This summary, 
it bears noting, should not be taken as a substitute for the 
actual trial evidence, which was far more explicit and which 
forms the basis for our Rule 403 analysis. 
 
 The parties addressed the content of the child 
pornography to be admitted at trial, in part, via pretrial 
motions.  Welshans offered to stipulate that the videos and 
images recovered constituted child pornography as a matter 
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of law.  The Government rejected the proposed stipulation.  
Instead, it sought to introduce a small subset of the images 
and videos recovered and promised not to introduce 
exceedingly violent and graphic ones.  The Government went 
on to explain that, in light of this Court’s decision in 
Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 391, it had “specifically excluded 
bondage” from the proffered videos to be shown to the jury.  
App. 52.  Providing one deeply disturbing example, the 
Government specified that it would not introduce videos 
“show[ing] a nine-year-old girl bound with yellow rope on 
her arms and legs being sexually abused by both an adult 
male and a dog.  We’re not showing any of that . . . .”  App. 
51.   
 
 As to the two videos to be shown to the jury, the 
District Court found that they were “prejudicial” and 
“disturbing,” but that the unfair prejudice did not outweigh 
their probative value.  App. 58.  The District Court found that 
the selected videos were admissible under Rule 403 “[g]iven 
that the government is proposing this very limited, highly 
condensed and representative sample of the total amount of 
evidence that exists and also given the fact that the 
government has presented . . . limiting instructions.”  
App. 58. 
 
 Pursuant to this pretrial ruling, the Government 
showed the jury two video clips, without sound, for 
approximately two and a half minutes.  The District Court 
gave cautionary instructions both before and after playing the 
videos and during the charge.   
 
 These two videos, however, were not the only 
evidence presented to the jury regarding the nature of the 
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child pornography recovered from Welshans’s computers.  
While the Government did not show any videos or images it 
deemed inadmissible under Cunningham, it did tell the jury 
about them—and repeatedly.  It introduced both testimony 
and exhibits that described horrific sexual acts of bestiality, 
bondage, and violence perpetrated on very young children, 
including babies.  
 
 To summarize the evidence at issue we begin with 
Exhibit 2.  This Government Exhibit contained five, detailed, 
paragraph-length descriptions of abhorrent acts of bestiality, 
bondage, and violence against children.  The descriptions 
include gruesome references to a young child being sexually 
victimized by man and a dog, being forcibly bound with rope, 
strapped with a belt, blindfolded, and forced to wear a choker 
collar.  This Exhibit was sent into the jury room during 
deliberations.  In addition, an agent read portions of Exhibit 2 
aloud to the jury, including references to the child victim 
being subjected to bestiality and bondage.   
 
 Other exhibits reiterated the message that Welshans 
possessed deeply abhorrent videos and images of child 
pornography.  The Government introduced disturbing file 
names and file paths that described, for example, the rape of a 
one year old baby, the anal rape of a child, and a sexual 
assault by a dog.  These too were sent to the jury room during 
deliberations.  A few of these file names were circled in red 
before the jury.  See App. 332 (“I’ll circle it here[.]”).  The 
prosecutor and witnesses read others aloud to the jury.  The 
jury also heard that the file names were consistent with their 
content.  For example, an agent testified that file names 
including the terms “1yo, 2yo are indicative . . . of what the 
subject matter would be”—child pornography depicting 
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sexual assaults perpetrated on one and two year old toddlers.  
App. 406. 
 
 Emphasizing the point, the Government elicited 
testimony from three separate agents that the videos shown to 
the jury were not the worst of the child pornography 
recovered.  One agent told the jury that there were “worse” 
videos depicting “bondage and bestiality.” App. 295.  
Another agent testified that he found “child pornography 
involving infants.”  App. 428.  He told the jury that one 
thousand five hundred images “depict[ed] the rape or 
molestation of toddlers, babies, and infants.”  App. 430.  He 
told the jury that the videos depicted acts of sexual violence 
on children, including “bondage” and “penetration of 
prepubescent children.”  App. 431-32.  He testified that what 
the jury was shown was not “representative of the full 
substance” of the child pornography recovered because there 
were “far more violent representations on the computer, far 
younger victims on this computer.” App. 442.  Another agent 
testified that there were “worse images or videos,” in which a 
child known to the testifying agent “is bound by rope and 
belts and . . . forced to have sex with a dog.”  App. 467.  
 
 In addition to this evidence, the Government’s opening 
and closing statements also highlighted the horrific nature of 
some of the child pornography recovered from Welshans’s 
computers.  During its opening statement, the prosecutor told 
the jury that the videos to be shown were “not nearly the 
worse [sic] of this selection” and “not the most violent.”  
App. 252-53.  In closing, the prosecutor “pull[ed] up Exhibit 
2” and asked the jury to “[r]emember some of the things 
. . . read to us, some of the horrible, disgusting terms . . . read 
to us that the defendant possessed and distributed.”  App. 658.  
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The Government went on to argue that “[t]here were images 
and videos of a little girl, a child being forced to do horrible 
things with dogs, a child being tied up, bound, collar around 
her neck, naked.”  App. 658.  The Government argued to the 
jury “[w]hat you saw wasn’t the most violent, it wasn’t the 
most horrific, it wasn’t the worse of the worse [sic] . . . It was 
a small cleaned-up portion just so you as the jurors would 




 The jury convicted Welshans of distribution and 
possession of child pornography.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), 
(b)(1), (a)(4)(B).  At sentencing, the District Court applied 
numerous Sentencing Guideline enhancements for specific 
offense characteristics, including enhancements for material 
involving “a prepubescent minor or a minor who had not 
attained the age of 12,” for material portraying “sadistic or 
masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence; or 
. . . sexual abuse or exploitation of an infant or toddler,” and 
for the number of files involved.  U.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.2(b)(2), 
(4), (7)(D).   
 
 The District Court also applied a two-level 
enhancement for obstruction of justice.  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  It 
found that the enhancement applied because Welshans moved 
files into his laptop’s recycling bin in a “panic” after 
receiving a call from his aunt that the police were on their 
way to his house.  App. 1053.  This enhancement increased 
the offense level to 39.  Welshans had a criminal history score 
of zero, which produced a Guideline range of 262 to 327 
months.  The Court varied downward to offense level 34, 
resulting in a final Guideline range of 151 to 188 months.  It 
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sentenced Welshans to the low end of the Guidelines range: 
151 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release.  




 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742.  We review an unpreserved prosecutorial 
misconduct claim for plain error.  Gov’t of the Virgin Islands 
v. Mills, 821 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2016).  The plain error 
test requires (1) an error; (2) that is “clear or obvious”; and 
(3) “affected the defendant’s substantial rights . . . which in 
the ordinary case means he or she must ‘show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the error,’ the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Molina-Martinez v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (quoting United 
States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76, 82 (2004)).  If 
these conditions are met, we will exercise discretion to 
correct the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).  We 
exercise plenary review of a district court’s interpretation of 
the Sentencing Guidelines and review its factual findings for 
clear error.  United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 75 (3d Cir. 




 In his first claim, Welshans asserts that the 
Government committed prosecutorial misconduct by 
informing the jury, through evidence and argument, that the 
child pornography recovered included deeply disturbing acts 
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of bestiality, bondage, and the violent sexual assault of very 
young children.  We agree with Welshans that the prosecution 
crossed the line.  Nevertheless, we conclude that the errors 




 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
guarantees the right to a fair trial including the right to be free 
from prosecutorial misconduct.  See United States v. Liburd, 
607 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 2010).  Our analysis of a 
prosecutorial misconduct claim proceeds in two steps.  Id. at 
342.  First, we consider whether there was misconduct.  “If 
so, we proceed to determine whether that misconduct ‘so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process,’” taking into account the 
entire proceeding.  United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 259 
(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Mills, 821 F.3d at 456 (quoting 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974))).  We 
consider “the prosecutor’s offensive actions in context and in 
light of the entire trial, assessing the severity of the conduct, 
the effect of the curative instructions, and the quantum of 
evidence against the defendant.”  Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 




 At the initial step of our analysis, Welshans asserts that 
the prosecution committed misconduct in two ways: (1) that it 
“systematically inject[ed] inadmissible . . . evidence” at trial, 
United States v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2008), 
and (2) that the prosecutor’s closing argument crossed the line 
by inflaming the passions and emotions of the jury, see, e.g., 
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 The Government may run afoul of the defendant’s due 
process right to a fair trial by “systematically injecting 
inadmissible . . . evidence” at trial, Morena, 547 F.3d at 194, 
 thereby “permeat[ing] the proceedings with prejudice[,]” id. 
at 196.  Welshans argues that the Government did so in his 
case by repeatedly introducing evidence that the child 
pornography recovered involved abhorrent acts of bestiality, 
bondage, and the violent sexual assault of very young 
children.  For the reasons below, we agree.   
 
 The central issue raised by Welshans’s claim is 
whether the evidence introduced by the Government was, in 
fact, inadmissible.  To answer this question, we begin with 
the premise that, as a rule, the Government is “entitled to 
prove its case free from any defendant’s option to stipulate 
the evidence away.”  Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 387 (quoting 
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997)).1 
                                              
1   In Old Chief, the Supreme Court acknowledged and 
reiterated “the familiar, standard rule that the prosecution is 
entitled to prove its case by evidence of its choice, or more 
exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit 
his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the 
Government chooses to present it.”  519 U.S. at 186-87. But 
the Court recognized an exception to that rule for proof that a 
defendant is a felon and so may not possess a firearm.  The 
felony conviction is relevant solely to “a defendant’s legal 




We go on to consider, however, that the Government’s 
evidence “remains subject to [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 
403,” id. at 388, which allows the court to “exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence,” Fed. R. Evid. 403.  A district court has 
broad discretion in conducting this analysis, provided that its 
reasoning is on the record.  See United States v. Bailey, 840 
F.3d 99, 117 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. Sampson, 980 
F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
 In Cunningham, we held that Rule 403 was violated 
when the district court admitted two particularly prejudicial 
videos of child pornography.  Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 391.  
On the facts of that case, those two videos, which 
“portray[ed] bondage or actual violence,” should not have 
been admitted.  Id. at 390.   
 
 Our Rule 403 holding in Cunningham was based in 
part on the District Court’s failure to review the videos 
themselves before deciding to admit them, and, in part, on the 
“extremely limited” probative value of the two videos.  Id. at 
383-87, 391.  We reasoned that, while the videos had some 
probative value, it was significantly reduced by the fact that 
                                                                                                     
independently of the concrete events of later criminal 
behavior charged against him.”  Id. at 190.  And the 
particulars of that past conviction are completely immaterial 
to the present charge before the jury.  Id. at 190-91.  So courts 
must allow defendants to stipulate to that fact and obviate 




other child pornography videos were in evidence, producing 
“diminishing marginal returns.”  Id. at 389; see also Bailey, 
840 F.3d at 122 (noting that “probative value is informed by 
the availability of alternative means to present similar 
evidence”) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).  
We also held that the probative value was outweighed, both 
because other video clips were admitted and because the 
defendant stipulated to the criminal nature of the child 
pornography, which “is a factor in the Rule 403 balancing” 
that district courts must undertake notwithstanding Old Chief.  
Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 386 n.23, 389-90; see also United 
States v. Finley, 726 F.3d 483, 492 (3d Cir. 2013) (same). 
 
 As to prejudice, we held that the two videos were 
enormously prejudicial.  Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 390.  
Reviewing descriptions of the videos (as they were not 
provided to the Court), id. at 391, we concluded they 
generated “intense disgust,” far beyond even other child 
pornography, id. at 390 (quoting United States v. Curtin, 489 
F.3d 935, 964 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., 
concurring)).  See also United States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 
965, 974 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that videos depicting “men 
raping and ejaculating in the genitals of prepubescent girls, as 
well as young girls engaging in sexual acts with each other 
. . . [,] have a strong tendency to produce intense disgust”).  
Indeed, the two videos stood out because “their violent and 
sadistic character likely created ‘disgust and antagonism’ 
toward [the defendant,] which risked ‘overwhelming 
prejudice’ toward him.” Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 390 





 Cunningham, Welshans now argues, ought to apply 
not only to visual images presented to the jury, but also to 
written or testimonial descriptions with the same “violent and 
sadistic character.”  Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 390.  As we 
acknowledged in Cunningham, verbal descriptions are less 
vivid than videos. See id. at 387. And in that case, we 
declined to adopt a per se rule.  See id. at 391. Nonetheless, 
the Government’s introduction of numerous, highly 
inflammatory written summaries is significant cause for 
concern. 
 
 In Welshans’s case, the Government introduced highly 
inflammatory descriptions of child pornography depicting 
abhorrent acts of bestiality, bondage, and violence perpetrated 
on very young children, including babies.  As in 
Cunningham, the probative value of this evidence was greatly 
diminished by the availability of other evidence.  Most 
obviously, the Government showed the jury two video clips—
themselves “prejudicial” and “disturbing,” App. 58—of child 
pornography, lasting in total almost two and a half minutes.  
The admission of these videos rendered the probative value of 
the additional descriptions “minimal.”  Cunningham, 694 
F.3d at 391 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, 
the Government had extensive evidence that did not involve 
violent or sadistic content, and Welshans stipulated that the 
files recovered were child pornography.  See id. at 386 n.23; 
Finley, 726 F.3d at 492.   
 
 The evidence at issue was immensely prejudicial.  
Reading the descriptions in Exhibit 2 and the related evidence 
elicits little more than a visceral response of disgust and 
anger.  See Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 390.  This point is 
seemingly obvious, but it has also been noted by several of 
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our sister Circuits.  See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 957 (holding that 
the district court committed procedural error under Rule 403 
by admitting, without first carefully reviewing every word of, 
a written description of a child “engaged in sexual acts of 
mutual oral copulation with, and masturbation of, a dog”); id. 
at 964 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (concluding that written 
descriptions of bestiality were unfairly prejudicial and 
reaching the same conclusion as to stories about incest); 
United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 385 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(holding unfairly prejudicial written narratives depicting 
sexual violence, including “young girls in chains, a young girl 
in handcuffs, and references to blood”); Harvey, 991 F.2d at 
996 (holding that descriptions of videos containing adult 
bestiality, sadomasochism, and acts involving human waste 
would “create disgust and antagonism toward [the child-
pornography defendant]” and “were highly prejudicial and 
posed a substantial risk of inflaming the jury”).   
 
 In short, this is the type of “highly reprehensible and 
offensive content that might lead a jury to convict because it 
thinks that the defendant is a bad person and deserves 
punishment, regardless of whether the defendant committed 
the charged crime.”  Loughry, 660 F.3d at 972.  Thus, we 
agree with Welshans that inadmissible evidence was 




 Welshans not only challenges the admission of 
prejudicial evidence, but also the prosecution’s closing 
argument—the second ground for his due process claim.  At 
closing, prosecutors “may not cross the line and invite the 
jury to render a decision on grounds of bias, passion, 
17 
 
prejudice, or sympathy.”  Mills, 821 F.3d at 458.  Rather, 
“[p]rosecutors . . . serve in positions of public trust . . . and 
must guard against the temptation to draw on jurors’ passions 
instead of the evidence, particularly in the heat of trial.”  Id. at 
460 n.10.  We have repeatedly labeled as improper arguments 
that are inflammatory or amount to “appeals for jurors to 
decide cases based on passion and emotion arising from 
sympathy for the victim.”  Id. at 460 (alteration and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Berrios, 
676 F.3d 118, 135 (3d Cir. 2012); Moore, 255 F.3d at 116-18.   
 
 Welshans argues that the prosecution inflamed the 
jury, invoking a visceral reaction, by referencing the 
despicable nature of some of the child pornography 
recovered—abhorrent depictions of bestiality, bondage, and 
violence against very young children.  Specifically, during its 
closing argument, the prosecutor returned to Exhibit 2 and its 
detailed and graphic descriptions of the files.  The prosecutor 
urged the jury to “[r]emember some of the things . . . read to 
us, some of the horrible, disgusting terms . . . read to us [that] 
the defendant possessed and distributed.”  App. 658.  The 
prosecutor argued that “[t]here were images and videos of a 
little girl, a child being forced to do horrible things with dogs, 
a child being tied up, bound, collar around her neck, naked.”  
Id.  The prosecutor reiterated to the jury that the video 
evidence shown to them “wasn’t the most violent, it wasn’t 
the most horrific, it wasn’t the worse of the worse [sic] . . . It 
was a small cleaned-up portion . . . .”  Id. 
 
 These viscerally inciteful words did nothing more than 
appeal to the jury’s raw passions and emotions, compounding 
the prejudicial potential of the summaries.  Cf. Cunningham, 
694 F.3d at 390 (noting that horrific, violent sexual acts 
18 
 
provoke feelings of “intense disgust”).  As such, we agree 
with Welshans that the prosecutor crossed the line.  Indeed, at 
oral argument, the Government conceded that at least some 
portion of its closing argument was improper.  See Oral 
Argument at 23:48 (“agree[ing] that those words should not 
have been used”); id. at 24:03 (conceding that “[w]e realize 
that it shouldn’t be done”).  Thus, based upon the 
combination of the evidence admitted and the closing 
argument, we conclude that there was misconduct and that 
“these errors were plain—that is, they were clear or obvious.”  




This, however, does not end our inquiry.  Having 
determined that misconduct occurred, we next consider 
whether it rises to the level of a constitutional violation.  See 
Liburd, 607 F.3d at 342.  We consider the severity of the 
prosecutorial misconduct, the curative instructions, and the 
strength of the evidence to determine whether the trial was 
“so infected . . . with unfairness as to make the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process.”  Repak, 852 F.3d at 259 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The first two aspects of 
the record support Welshans; however, we conclude that the 
strength of the evidence is so overwhelming that it outweighs 
the other two considerations.  Mills, 821 F.3d at 465.   
 
 The misconduct in this case was indeed pervasive.  
See, e.g., id. at 462; Morena, 547 F.3d at 194-96.  As 
described above, the Government repeatedly introduced 
exhibits that were read aloud; elicited testimony from various 
agents; and argued to the jury that the child pornography 
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recovered involved bestiality, bondage, and violent acts 
against very young children.   
 
 We next consider the District Court’s curative 
instructions, which we presume the jury follows.  See Liburd, 
607 F.3d at 344.  “The more severe the misconduct, the less 
effective the curative instructions—particularly when . . . 
[they] are not given immediately after the misconduct or 
when they do not direct the jury to ignore specific instances 
of misconduct.”  Mills, 821 F.3d at 462.  In this case, the 
District Court gave several curative instructions regarding the 
videos shown to the jury.  In contrast, there was no curative 
instruction specific to the prejudicial descriptions, which 
favors Welshans.  See, e.g., Morena, 547 F.3d at 197 (noting 
that a trial court’s “general instruction was hardly a specific 
direction to disregard the [inadmissible] evidence”); Loughry, 
660 F.3d at 975 (stating that a “single boilerplate limiting 
instruction” did not cure the erroneous admission of 
uncharged “hard core” pornography). 
 
 This brings us to the strength of the evidence.  “The 
quantum or weight of evidence is crucial to determining 
whether prosecutorial misconduct was so prejudicial as to 
result in a denial of due process.”  Liburd, 607 F.3d at 344 
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).  In this 
analysis, notably, we do not merely consider the sufficiency 
of the evidence.  See Morena, 547 F.3d at 197.  We also take 
into account whether the misconduct “shaped the 
development of the record evidence . . . or the trial strategy 
pursued by either party.”  Liburd, 607 F.3d at 345.  Where the 
defense raised involved witness credibility, we take into 
account how the prosecutorial misconduct may have “affected 
the jury’s credibility determination.”  Mills, 821 F.3d at 463.   
20 
 
 The evidence against Welshans was overwhelming.  
There is no dispute as to any of the following facts: his laptop 
and desktop computers contained child pornography.  
Welshans was the sole user of the two computers.  He 
installed and used a file-sharing network on his laptop.  The 
laptop’s file-sharing network was used to distribute child 
pornography.  Welshans used the Internet account from which 
the child pornography was distributed.  He was at his aunt’s 
house, where the files were shared, on the last day his laptop 
accessed child pornography.   
 
 Despite all of this, Welshans asked the jury to find—
on the basis of his credibility alone—that he did not know 
that there was child pornography on his computers.  We 
cannot hold that the Government’s misconduct affected this 
credibility determination.  Rather, Welshans’s claim that he 
lacked knowledge of the child pornography was 
“irreconcilable with both the testimony and the physical 
evidence at trial.”  Mills, 821 F.3d at 464.  Welshans provided 
no plausible explanation for how child pornography could 
have been amassed and stored on his computers without his 
knowledge.  Child pornography was found on both his laptop 
and desktop computers.  The number of files was immense—
over ten thousand images and hundreds of videos.  Not only 
that, Welshans tried to rid himself of the evidence at the last 
minute—albeit ineptly—when his aunt called to tell him that 
the police were en route “looking for stuff” involving his 
computers.  App. 495.  In short, the overwhelming strength of 
the evidence “weighs decisively against [Welshans] and is 
dispositive in this case.”  Mills, 821 F.3d at 463.  Thus, we 
conclude that, despite the prosecutorial misconduct that 
occurred, his trial was not fundamentally unfair.  See id. at 





 In his second claim Welshans challenges a procedural 
aspect of his sentencing hearing—that the District Court 
improperly applied the obstruction of justice enhancement.  
We agree and will remand for a new sentencing hearing at 




 Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides a 
two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice where, inter 
alia, the defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded, or 
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice 
with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of 
the instant offense of conviction.”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  As we 
have explained “‘[w]illfully’ in this context means 
‘deliberately or intentionally; in other words, not negligently, 
inadvertently, or accidentally.’”  United States v. Douglas, 
885 F.3d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. 
Jenkins, 275 F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2001)).  However, “the 
conduct to which [Section 3C1.1] applies is not subject to 
precise definition.”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.3.  “Obstructive 
conduct can vary widely in nature, degree of planning, and 
seriousness.”  Id.  The enhancement “is not an invitation to 
consider every instance in which a defendant acted in a 
blameworthy fashion.”  Jenkins, 275 F.3d at 289.   
 
 To better delineate the bounds of this enhancement, the 
Sentencing Commission has provided examples in 
Application Notes 4 and 5.  See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.3.  
We give these Application Notes “controlling weight unless 
. . . plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” 
22 
 
something the Government does not here allege.  United 
States v. Landmesser, 378 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 
United States v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 372 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
 Application Note 4 generally gives “examples of the 
types of conduct to which this adjustment is intended to 
apply.”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.3.  Application Note 5 
provides that “some forms of obstructive conduct—including 
fleeing from arrest, providing incomplete or misleading 
information during a presentence investigation, and making 
false statements while not under oath—do not merit the 
enhancement.”  Jenkins, 275 F.3d at 290 (citing U.S.S.G. 
§ 3C1.1, cmt. n.5).   
 
 The specific note before us is Application Note 4(D).  
It provides that the obstruction of justice enhancement applies 
to some, but not all, acts of destroying or concealing 
evidence.  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(D).  Specifically, 
Application Note 4(D) states that Section 3C1.1 applies to 
 
destroying or concealing . . . 
evidence that is material to an 
official investigation or judicial 
proceeding (e.g., shredding a 
document or destroying ledgers 
upon learning that an official 
investigation has commenced or is 
about to commence), or 
attempting to do so; however, if 
such conduct occurred 
contemporaneously with arrest 
(e.g., attempting to swallow or 
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throw away a controlled 
substance), it shall not, standing 
alone, be sufficient to warrant an 
adjustment for obstruction unless 
it results in a material hindrance 
to the official investigation or 
prosecution of the instant offense 
or the sentencing of the offender; 
 
Id. (emphasis added).   
 
As is particularly relevant here, if the destroying or 
concealing (1) “occurred contemporaneously with arrest,” but 
(2) did not “result[] in a material hindrance to the official 
investigation or prosecution” of the case, then Section 3C1.1 




 Welshans argues that the both premises of Application 
Note 4(D) obtain and, therefore, that Section 3C1.1 is 




 We begin by asking whether Welshans was destroying 
or concealing evidence “contemporaneously with arrest” 
when he moved files into his laptop’s recycling bin in a 
“panic” after receiving a call from his aunt that the police 
were on their way to his house.  App. 1053.   
 
 In this phrase, the term “contemporaneous” is highly 
context-dependent.  While courts use the term “to mean 
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‘close in time,’ it is a relative term.”  Small Bus. in 
Telecomms. v. FCC, 251 F.3d 1015, 1022 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 
2001).  Indeed, depending on the context, “contemporaneous” 
could mean minutes or years.  Id. (collecting cases); see also 
Contemporaneous, The Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language (2d ed. 1987) (defining contemporaneous 
as “living or occurring during the same period of time; 
contemporary”).   
 
 That the Sentencing Commission chose such a flexible 
term is unsurprising given the text of Application Note 3.  It 
observes that “the conduct to which [Section 3C1.1] applies is 
not subject to precise definition” and that its applicability is 
best determined through examples.  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. 
n.3. Just so, we draw upon illustrative cases to better 
understand the meaning of “contemporaneous” for the 
purposes of Application Note 4(D). 
 
 The most closely analogous case, cited by Welshans, is 
United States v. Norman, 129 F.3d 1393, 1400 (10th Cir. 
1997).  There the defendant ran a stop sign, causing a car 
accident.  Id. at 1395.  He immediately left his car and began 
to hide an item in the dirt, as lay witnesses looked on.  Id. at 
1396.  The defendant was still kicking the dirt when the 
police arrived.  Id.  At sentencing, the district court applied 
the obstruction of justice enhancement, but the Tenth Circuit 
reversed.  It held that the defendant acted 
“contemporaneously with arrest” under Application Note 
4(D) even though he began hiding the item before the police 
arrived because he “understood that his failure to stop caused 
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the accident, and that he would be questioned and detained as 
soon as the police arrived.”  Id. at 1400.2 
 
 Also illustrative is United States v. Savard, 964 F.2d 
1075, 1078 (11th Cir. 1992).  The police knocked and 
announced their intent to search a boat, and the conspirators 
hid a Coast Guard boarding slip in a shoe.  Id. at 1076-77.  
The agents then entered the boat where some agents 
questioned the conspirators and one agent left to investigate 
further.  Id.  After the agent returned, they searched the ship, 
and ultimately arrested the conspirators.  Id.  The Eleventh 
Circuit held that hiding the boarding slip occurred 
“contemporaneous with arrest” for the purposes of 
Application Note 4(D).  Id. at 1078.  This was so even though 
there was an interval—consisting of the investigation and 
search—between the act of hiding the boarding slip and the 
defendant’s subsequent arrest.  See Norman, 129 F.3d at 1400 
(citing Savard for this point); see also Dissenting Op. at 5 
(acknowledging that “there was a gap between the obstruction 
and arrest”).  Therefore, under Savard, “contemporaneous” 
must be defined more flexibly than the dissent’s position that 
                                              
 2 The dissent emphasizes that in Norman, as noted 
above, the defendant was kicking the dirt when the police 
arrived.  But Welshans too was continuing to delete files 
when the police entered his home.  While the dissent would 
make much of the fact that Welshans was not “actively” 
concealing evidence, Dissenting Op. at 4; see also id. at 1, the 





the conduct necessarily occur “just prior to arrest.”  
Dissenting Op. at 3 (citation omitted).3 
 
 In contrast, our sister Circuits have held that 
defendants who acted while detained, away from the scene, 
post-arrest did not act “contemporaneously with arrest.”  See 
United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 416 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(defendant made phone call from jail post-indictment); United 
States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 821 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(defendant concealed drugs while handcuffed to hospital bed 
post-arrest); United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 608-09 
(6th Cir. 2000) (defendant made telephone call from jail six 
hours post-arrest); United States v. Hankins, 127 F.3d 932, 
935 (10th Cir. 1997) (defendant made phone call from jail 
two days post-arrest); but see United States v. Morales-
                                              
 3 In Savard, the obstruction was “contemporaneous” 
despite a gap in time between the conduct and arrest.  In the 
face of this holding, the dissent attempts to distinguish the 
gap in time in Savard from the analogous gap in time in 
Welshans’s case based upon the physical position of the 
police.  Yet in both cases, the police were closing in on the 
defendants physically.  In Savard, the police were knocking at 
the hatch of the boat.  In Welshans’s case, agents were 
surveilling his house and the arresting agents were en route.  
Indeed, the dissent acknowledges that the surveilling agents 
had already arrived when Welshans acted, Dissenting Op. at 
5, although it elsewhere elides this point by stating that 
Welshans acted before agents “arrived to search,” Dissenting 
Op. at 1, 4, 5 (emphasis added).  Moreover, the impact on 
Welshans was the same as in Savard—he acted in “panic,” as 




Sanchez, 609 F.3d 637, 640 (5th Cir. 2010) (where defendant 
made phone call from the back seat of a patrol car, the 
Government conceded that he acted “contemporaneously with 
arrest”).4 
 
 Unlike these cases, Welshans moved files into his 
laptop’s recycling bin in a “panic” after his aunt called to tell 
him that the police were on their way to his house.  App. 
1053.  Around the time that Welshans acted, agents were 
surveilling his house; other agents arrived soon after with a 
search warrant, “detained,” handcuffed, and held him in a 
police cruiser.  App. 339.  Under these circumstances, as in 
Norman and Savard, we conclude that Welshans acted 
“contemporaneously with arrest” for the purposes of 
Application Note 4(D).5 
                                              
 4  Welshans’s case does not require us to rule on the 
propriety of these decisions.   
 
 5 The dissent characterizes our holding as resting 
solely on the fact that Welshans acted “upon learning of an 
investigation likely to result in arrest,” and suggests that the 
result would be the same regardless of the interval between 
the defendant’s conduct and arrest.  Dissenting Op. at 5.  This 
is not so.  Rather, we rely on the totality of the circumstances, 
including that Welshans acted in a “panic,” App. 1053, when 
he believed arrest was imminent, as agents were surveilling 
his house, and shortly before he was detained. 
 
 Furthermore, our holding will not produce the 
consequences invoked by the dissent.  Critically, the dissent 
focuses on one element of the Application Note—obstructive 





 The question that follows is whether Welshans’s 
conduct “result[ed] in a material hindrance to the official 
investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(D).  Section 3C1.1 does not define 
“material hindrance.”  Application Note 6, however, defines a 
phrase with a common word, “material evidence.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 3C1.1, cmt. n.6 (“‘Material’ evidence, fact, statement, or 
information, as used in this section, means evidence, fact, 
statement, or information that, if believed, would tend to 
influence or affect the issue under determination.”) (emphasis 
added).  Consistent with this text, the Fifth Circuit has held 
that a material hindrance “requires, at the least, an actual, 
negative effect on either the course or result of the 
investigation.”  Morales-Sanchez, 609 F.3d at 641 (emphasis 
added).  We agree.   
 
 In its brief, the Government did not argue that placing 
files in the recycling bin amounted to a “material hindrance.”  
Rather, it took the position that Application Note 4(D) was 
                                                                                                     
though the Guidelines also require that the conduct “result[] 
in a material hindrance to the official investigation.” U.S.S.G. 
§ 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(D).  This is a conjunctive test: if the conduct 
occurs contemporaneously with an arrest but does not 
materially hinder the investigation, it does not qualify for the 
enhancement.  As noted above, the deleted files were easily 
restored.  Thus, our reading is not as far-reaching as the 
dissent suggests; a defendant is not “exempt from the . . . 
enhancement” if he permanently destroys evidence, even if 
his actions begin as soon as he “believe[s] he would be 
arrested.” Dissenting Op. at 5. 
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“inapplicable” because Welshans did not act 
“contemporaneously with arrest.”  Gov’t Br. 28; see also id. 
(arguing that material hindrance was not “the proper 
question” before the Court).  This was a sound tactical choice, 
as none of the files in the recycling bin were lost.  To the 
contrary, several witnesses testified that files in a computer’s 
recycling bin are easily restored merely by clicking the 
mouse.   
 
 Still, at oral argument the Government appeared to 
contest the “material hindrance” issue for the first time.  In 
response to questions from the Court, the Government argued 
that its investigation was materially hindered because it took 
“extra time” to verify that no files were lost, and because the 
issue was referenced at trial (notably, as evidence of guilt).  
See Oral Argument at 28:53 (“It took us time to go back 
through and determine [that no files were lost]”); id. at 29:15 
(“Again we had to take the extra time to go ahead and look at 
those things.  Plus it was a contested issue at trial.”); see also 
App. 642 (consciousness of guilt jury instruction). 
 
 Because this contention was raised for the first time at 
oral argument, it is waived.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 135 n.9 (3d Cir. 2017); In re Grand 
Jury, 635 F.3d 101, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011).  But even if we 
were to reach the Government’s argument, we would hold 
that there was no material hindrance.   
 
 The Government’s interpretation of “material 
hindrance” is far too broad.  All acts of destroying or 
concealing evidence require at least some “extra time” to 
investigate and are potential trial issues.  For example, 
Application Note 4(D) explicitly cites “throw[ing] away a 
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controlled substance” as an example of an act that may not 
warrant the obstruction of justice enhancement.  U.S.S.G. 
§ 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(D).  If this act is contemporaneous with 
arrest and there is no “material hindrance,” then the 
enhancement does not apply.  Id.  But under the 
Government’s definition, there would always be a “material 
hindrance.”  For any time a defendant throws away drugs, the 
investigation takes at least some “extra time,” and the act is a 
potential trial issue.   
 
 Illustrative cases further reinforce the point that the 
Government’s interpretation of “material hindrance” is overly 
broad.  At least one court has held that throwing cocaine out 
of a car window during a high speed chase does not, 
“standing alone, warrant the enhancement.”  United States v. 
Giacometti, 28 F.3d 698, 700 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994).   
 
 In another example, Morales-Sanchez, the defendant 
made a phone call from the back of a patrol car, asking his 
friend to report a truck as stolen.  609 F.3d at 639.  The police 
then received a false report.  Id. at 641.  Even so, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the false report was not a “material 
hindrance” because there was no evidence that it “had any 
actual effect on the investigation.”  Id.  It reversed the 
application of Section 3C1.1. 
 
 Likewise, in Savard, the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
defendant did not materially hinder the investigation by 
hiding a Coast Guard boarding slip because “Customs agents 
already possessed all of this information.”  Savard, 964 F.2d 
at 1078.  This was so even though concealing the slip forced 
the agents to independently verify the information it 
contained.  Id.; see also United States v. Perry, 991 F.2d 304, 
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312 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that there was no material 
hindrance where the defendant placed robbery proceeds in a 
box and told a relative to hide it).   
 
 Just so, the Government was not materially hindered 
when Welshans moved files into the recycling bin.  The files 
were easily restored, and none were lost.  The fact that this 
process took “extra time” and was raised at trial as evidence 
of guilt in no way amounts to a “material hindrance” under 
Application Note 4(D).  Thus, we conclude that the Section 




 Finally, we conclude that remand is necessary.  “By 
improperly applying the obstruction of justice enhancement, 
the District Court did not accurately calculate [Welshans’s] 
Guidelines range.”  Douglas, 885 F.3d at 153.  Although the 
Court imposed a downward variance, we “cannot be sure” 
that the erroneous calculation did not affect the sentence 
imposed.  Id. at 154.  In other words, “[t]he present case is not 
that rare case where we can be sure that an erroneous 
Guidelines calculation did not affect the sentencing process 
and the sentence ultimately imposed.”  United States v. 
Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2008).  Thus, we will 
reverse the imposition of the two-level enhancement under 




 We will affirm the judgment of conviction, vacate the 
judgment of sentence, and remand for resentencing.  
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
I agree with the majority’s prosecutorial misconduct 
analysis.  I disagree, however, with my colleagues’ 
conclusion that the District Court erred in applying a 
sentencing enhancement for obstruction under U.S.S.G. § 
3C1.1 because Welshans’ attempted deletion of child 
pornography files from his laptop computer occurred 
“contemporaneously with arrest.”   
 
No one disputes that, on the morning Welshans was 
found in possession of thousands of child pornography 
images and videos, Welshans’ aunt warned him that agents 
were en route to his home.  After being warned, but 40 
minutes before agents arrived to search his home, Welshans 
highlighted incriminating files on his laptop and selected 
“delete.”  Each file then sequentially moved to the laptop’s 
recycle bin.  Thereafter, Welshans stashed the laptop between 
couch cushions so it would not be discovered.  Importantly, 
the process of moving files to the recycle bin occurred 
automatically and outside of Welshans’ presence.   
 
With this context in mind, it cannot be that Welshans’ 
purposeful conduct—which, again, occurred well before 
agents arrived to search his home—falls within the 
“contemporaneously with arrest” exception to § 3C1.1’s 
obstruction enhancement.  By holding otherwise, the majority 
permits that limited exception to swallow the rule that 
obstructive conduct triggers an enhanced sentence.   
 
Because Welshans clearly attempted to destroy 
material evidence, I would affirm the District Court’s 
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imposition of the obstruction enhancement.  I therefore 




As the majority observes, § 3C1.1 provides for a two-
level sentencing enhancement when “the defendant willfully 
obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, 
the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, 
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of 
conviction.”  The enhancement applies where, inter alia, a 
defendant attempts to destroy or conceal “evidence that is 
material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding.”1  
In this regard, § 3C1.1 notes, by way of non-exhaustive 
example, that “shredding a document or destroying ledgers 
upon learning that an official investigation has commenced or 
is about to commence” qualifies for an obstruction 
enhancement.2 
 
Nevertheless, if otherwise covered conduct “occurred 
contemporaneously with arrest,” that conduct, “standing 
alone,” is insufficient to warrant an obstruction enhancement 
“unless it results in a material hindrance to the official 
investigation or prosecution of the instant offense or the 
sentencing of the offender.”3  Relying on this exception, 
today the majority holds that the obstruction enhancement 
was improper because Welshans acted “contemporaneously 
                                              
1 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(D).   
2 Id. 
3 Id.   
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with arrest” and the Government was not materially hindered 
since the files were easily restored.  I disagree. 
 
The majority notes that “contemporaneous” is “a 
flexible term” which “could mean minutes or years.”4  
However, “‘[c]ontemporaneous’ for purposes of § 3C1.1 has 
been construed to encompass obstructive conduct just prior to 
arrest, as when the police are at the defendant’s door.”5  
Accordingly, “this limited exception [] include[s] only 
conduct admitting a spontaneous or visceral or reflexive 
response occurring at the point arrest becomes imminent.”6  
“It does not . . . apply to [] cool and deliberate actions.”7 
 
 In finding that Welshans acted “contemporaneously 
with arrest,” the majority relies heavily on the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Norman.8  However, Norman is 
distinguishable.  In Norman, the defendant caused a car 
accident and attempted to hide drugs in dirt in front of his car.  
While it is true that the defendant “began hiding the [drugs] 
                                              
4 Maj. Op. at 24. 
5 United States v. Hankins, 127 F.3d 932, 935 (10th Cir. 
1997) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Perry, 991 
F.2d 304, 312 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a defendant’s 
“hurried attempt to conceal [] evidence as the police stood at 
the front door was ‘contemporaneous with arrest’”).   
6 United States v. Lamere, 980 F.2d 506, 515 n.6 (8th Cir. 
1992). 
7 Id. 
8 129 F.3d 1393 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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before the police arrived,”9 in concluding that he acted 
“contemporaneously with arrest,” the Court stressed that the 
defendant was still attempting to conceal evidence when the 
police arrived.10  In this regard, the Court observed that the 
defendant “was [] ‘kicking at the dirt’ in front of his car when 
the first officer” arrived and that he “was arrested within 
moments of that arrival.”11 
 
Here, unlike the defendant in Norman, Welshans was 
not actively engaged in obstructive conduct when the agents 
arrived to search his home.  Rather, 40 minutes before the 
agents arrived, Welshans chose a large group of files, selected 
“delete,” and hid the laptop between couch cushions.  What’s 
more, as the majority observes, after Welshans’ conduct, the 
transfer of files to the recycle bin “could run automatically” 
without his presence at the computer.12  Thus, in my view, 
Welshans’ conduct was not the type of reflexive action 
excepted from the enhancement.  To the contrary, Welshans’ 
conduct appears calculated and purposeful. 
 
The majority also relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Savard.13  In Savard, the Court 
held that a defendant’s concealment of evidence in his shoe as 
agents knocked on the hatch of his boat occurred 
“contemporaneously with arrest,” even though the defendant 
                                              
9 Maj. Op. at 24. 
10 Norman, 129 F.3d at 1400. 
11 Id. 
12 Maj. Op. at 4. 
13 964 F.2d 1075 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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was not arrested until later.14  Crucially, however, the 
obstructive conduct in Savard occurred when the agents 
announced themselves at the defendant’s hatch door.  
Moreover, while there was a gap between the obstruction and 
arrest in that case, it was undisputed that agents remained on 
the boat for that entire period.  In contrast, here, Welshans 
acted 40 minutes before agents arrived to search his home.  
Further, while it is true that agents were surveilling 
Welshans’ home around the time of his conduct, none of 
those agents entered his home until the search warrant was 
executed, 40 minutes after Welshans acted.    
 
Finally, on a practical level, interpreting 
“contemporaneously with arrest” to capture Welshans’ 
conduct could produce absurd results.  The following 
hypothetical, of which there are myriad variations, is 
illustrative.  Suppose that, like Welshans, a defendant 
unsuccessfully tried to destroy evidence after learning that 
agents were en route.  Further suppose that the defendant 
believed he would be arrested when the agents arrived.  
However, unlike our case, suppose that the agents had a car 
accident and were delayed until the next day.  Under today’s 
holding, our hypothetical defendant’s failed attempt to 
destroy evidence would have occurred “contemporaneously 
with arrest”—and thus would be exempt from the obstruction 
enhancement—even though the agents were delayed.   
 
Simply, today the majority indicates that—so long as 
there is no material hindrance—obstructive acts taken upon 
learning of an investigation likely to result in arrest occur 
“contemporaneously with arrest.”  I cannot agree with such a 
                                              
14 Id. at 1076, 1078–79. 
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result.  While our Court has not defined “contemporaneously 
with arrest,” I disagree with the majority that Welshans’ 
obstructive conduct meets this limited exception.  I would 
therefore find that the “material hindrance” requirement is 
inapplicable and the District Court was permitted to apply the 
obstruction enhancement even though the Government 




 For the foregoing reasons, while I join my colleagues 
in affirming Welshans’ conviction, I dissent from the decision 
to reverse the application of the obstruction enhancement and 
remand for resentencing.   
